

## **II. REMARKS**

### **A. Introduction**

The Final Office Action dated February 4, 1998 (Final Office Action) has been carefully reviewed and the foregoing amendments made in response thereto.

Claims 10-12 are amended. Claims 10-12 are pending in the application.

Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventors, at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

Claims 10-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which Applicants regards as the invention.

Claims 10-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a, b, and e) as being anticipated by Saeki et al. (U.S. Patent No. 4,455,570).

Claims 10-12 remain active in this application. No new matter is presented in the foregoing amendments. Approval and entry of same is respectfully requested.

### **B. Summary of Amendments**

The Applicants have amended Claims 10-12 to further clarify the scope of the invention as required by the Final Office Action.

With respect to Claim 10, the informality noted in paragraph 7 has been corrected. The new matter discussed in paragraph 8 has been canceled as required by the Final Office Action. Claim 10 has also been amended to distinguish between 'specific combined medium programming' and 'combined medium programming'. 'Combined medium programming' has been further clarified as '*first* combined medium programming'. Additionally, the Applicants have amended Claim 10 to further clarify

that the one of either a code or datum which is stored is that which is selected and communicated. Finally, the term remote *station* in line 25 now reads remote *site*.

With respect to Claim 11, the Applicants clarified the distinction between the 'specific combined medium programming' and the 'combined medium programming'.

With respect to Claim 12, the Applicants clarified the distinction between the 'specific combined medium programming' and the 'combined medium programming'. Additionally, the Applicants amended the Claim in line 24 to read 'transmission station' as opposed to 'transmitter station'.

**C. Response to Requirement Imposed Upon Applicants to  
Resolve Alleged Conflicts Between Applicants'  
Applications**

Applicants respectfully traverse the requirements of the Final Office Action paragraph 5.

Paragraph 5 of the Final Office Action requires Applicants to either:

- (1) file terminal disclaimers in each of the related 329 applications terminally disclaiming each of the other 328 applications; or
- (2) provide an affidavit attesting to the fact that all claims in the 329 applications have been reviewed by applicant and that no conflicting claims exist between the applications; or
- (3) resolve all conflicts between claims in the related 329 applications by identifying how all the claims in the instant application are distinct and separate inventions from all the claims in the above identified 328 applications.

In addition, Examiner states that failure to comply with any one of these requirements will result in abandonment of the application.

Examiner states that the requirement has been made because conflicts exist between claims of the related co-pending applications, including the present application. Examiner sets forth only the serial numbers of the co-pending applications

without an indication of which claims are conflicting. Examiner has also attached an Appendix providing what is deemed to be clear evidence that conflicting claims exist between the 328 related co-pending applications and the present application. Further, Examiner states that an analysis of all claims in the 328 related co-pending applications would be an extreme burden on the Office requiring millions of claim comparisons.

Applicants respectfully traverse these requirements in that Examiner has both improperly imposed the requirements, and has incorrectly indicated that abandonment will occur upon failure to comply with the requirement. Applicants' traversal is supported by the fact that 37 C.F.R. § 1.78 (b) does not, under the present circumstances, provide Examiner with authority to require Applicants to either: 1) file terminal disclaimers; 2) file an affidavit; or 3) resolve all apparent conflicts. Additionally, the penalty of abandonment of the instant application for failure to comply with the aforementioned requirement is improper for being outside the legitimate authority to impose abandonment upon an application. The following remarks in Section (B) will explain Applicants' basis for this traversal.

**1. The PTO's New Requirement is an Unlawfully  
Promulgated Substantive Rule Outside the  
Commissioner's Statutory Grant of Power**

The PTO Commissioner obtains his statutory rulemaking authority from the Congress through the provisions of Title 35 of the United States Code. The broadest grant of rulemaking authority – 35 U.S.C. § 6 (a) -- permits the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to "the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]". This provision does NOT grant the Commissioner authority to issue substantive rules of patent law. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930, 18 USPQ2d 1677, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1991).<sup>1</sup> Applicants respectfully submit that the Examiner's creation of a

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<sup>1</sup>Accord Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 526, 16 USPQ2d 1549, 1552 (Fed Cir. 1990); Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 398-99, 13 USPQ2d 1628, 1632-33 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Ethicon Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425, 7 USPQ2d 1152, 1154 (Fed. Cir 1988).

new set of requirements based upon 37 CFR § 1.78(b) constitutes an unlawful promulgation of a substantive rule in direct contradiction of a long-established statutory and regulatory scheme.

## 2. The PTO's Requirement is a Substantive Rule

The first determination is whether the requirement as imposed by the PTO upon Applicants is substantive or a procedural rule. The Administrative Procedure Act offers general guidelines under which all administrative agencies must operate. A fundamental premise of administrative law is that administrative agencies must act solely within their statutory grant of power. *Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The PTO Commissioner has NOT been granted power to promulgate substantive rules of patent law. *Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler*, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996), citing, *Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg*, 932 F.2d 920, 930, 18 USPQ2d 1677, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

The appropriate test for such a determination is an assessment of the rule's impact on the Applicants' rights and interests under the patent laws. *Fressola v. Manbeck*, 36 USPQ2d 1211, 1215 (DDC 1995). As the PTO Commissioner has no power to promulgate substantive rules, the Commissioner receives no deference in his interpretation of the statutes and laws that give rise to the instant requirement. *Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler*, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996), citing, *Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). When agency rules either (a) depart from existing practice or (b) impact the substantive rights and interests of the effected party, the rule must be considered substantive. *Nat'l Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v. Scheiker*, 690 F.2d 932, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1982), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983).

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a. **The PTO Requirement is Substantive  
Because it Radically Changes Long Existing  
Patent Practice by Creating a New  
Requirement Upon Applicants Outside the  
Scope of 37 C.F.R. § 1.78 (b)**

The Examiner's requirement is totally distinguishable from the well articulated requirement authorized by 37 CFR § 1.78 (b), because it (1) creates and imposes a new requirement to avoid abandonment of the application based on the allegation that conflicts exist between claims of the related 328 co-pending applications, and (2) it results in an effective final double patenting rejection without the PTO's affirmative double patenting rejection of the claims. Long existing patent practice recognizes only two types of double patenting, double patenting based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 (statutory double patenting) and double patenting analogous to 35 U.S.C. § 103 (the well-known obviousness type double patenting).<sup>2</sup> These two well established types of double patenting use an objective standard to determine when they are appropriate<sup>3</sup> and have a determinable result on the allowability of the pending claims.

The Examiner's new requirement represents a radical departure from long existing patent practice relevant to conflicting claims between co-pending applications of the same inventive entity. Two well established double patenting standards are based on an objective analysis of comparing pending and *allowed* claims. However, in the

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<sup>2</sup>MPEP § 804(B)(1) states, in an admittedly awkward fashion, that the inquiry for obviousness type double patenting is analogous to a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103: "since the analysis employed in an obvious-type double patenting determination parallels the guidelines for a 35 U.S.C. 103 rejection, the factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are employed when making an obvious-type double patenting analysis".

<sup>3</sup>The objective test for same invention double patenting is whether one of the claims being compared could be literally infringed without literally infringing the other. The objective test for obviousness type double patenting is the same as the objective nonobviousness requirement of patentability with the difference that the disclosure of the first patent may not be used as prior art.

present application, there are no *allowed* claims. The Examiner's new requirement to avoid a double patenting rejection presumes that conflicts exist between claims in the present application and claims in the 327 co-pending applications. This presumption of conflicts between claims represents a radical departure from long existing patent practice as defined by 37 C.F.R. § 1.78 (b), which states:

Where two or more applications filed by the same applicant contain conflicting claims, elimination of such claims from all but one application may be required in the absence of good and sufficient reason for their retention during pendency in more than one application.

Clearly, the only requirement authorized by the rule is the elimination of conflicting claims from all but one application where conflicting claims have been determined to exist. Furthermore, in order to determine that conflicting claims do in fact exist in multiple applications, the only possible analysis is obviousness-type double patenting, since there are no allowed or issued claims by which to employ the 35 U.S.C. § 101 statutory double patenting analysis. Once obviousness-type double patenting analysis has been applied and conflicting claims have been determined to exist, only a *provisional* obviousness-type double patenting rejection is possible until claims from one application are allowed.

In summary, the Examiner's new requirement departs from long-established practice because it (1) creates and imposes a new requirement to avoid abandonment of the application based on the allegation that conflicts exist between claims of the related 328 co-pending applications, and (2) it results in an effective final double patenting rejection without the PTO's affirmative double patenting rejection of the claims.

Therefore, the Examiner's new requirement departs from existing practice and therefore is a substantive rule beyond the authority of the PTO and is therefore, invalid.

**b. The New Requirement is Also a Substantive Rule Because it Adversely Impacts the Rights and Interests of Applicants to Benefits of the Patent**

The rights and benefits of a U.S. patent is solely a statutory right. *Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler*, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The essential statutory right in a patent is the right to exclude others from making, using and selling the claimed invention during the term of the patent. Courts have recognized that sometimes new procedural rules of the PTO are actually substantive rules, e.g. when the new rule made a substantive difference in the ability of the applicant to claim his discovery. *Fressola v. Manbeck*, 36 USPQ2d 1211, 1214 (DDC 1995) (emphasis added), citing, *In re Pilkington*, 411 F.2d 1345, 1349; 162 USPQ 145 (CCPA 1969); and *In re Steppan*, 394 F.2d 1013, 1019; 156 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1967).

The new requirement, on its face and as applied here, is an instance of a PTO rule making a substantive difference in Applicants' ability to claim their invention and, therefore, must be considered a substantive rule. The requirement denies Applicants rights and benefits expressly conferred by the patent statute. The measure of the value of these denied rights and benefits is that the requirement, as applied here, would deny Applicants the full and complete PTO examination of Applicants' claims on their merits, as specified by 37 C.F.R. § 1.105. In addition, to file terminal disclaimers in each of the related 329 applications terminally disclaiming each of the other 328 applications based on the PTO's incomplete examination on the merits would deny Applicants the benefit of the full patent term of 17 years on each of Applicants' respective applications. Applicants respectfully submit that the requirement has a huge impact on their rights and interests in the presently claimed invention.

**c. Conclusion: Substantive Rule**

In summary, the requirement is a change to long existing practice and/or has a substantive impact on the rights and interests of Applicants to their invention. Either

finding means that the new requirement is a substantive rule. Since the Commissioner has no power to issue substantive rules, the requirement is an improperly promulgated substantive rule having no force of law.

**3. The PTO Requirement is Outside the Scope of 37 C.F.R. § 1.78 (b)**

Rule 78 (b) states that:

Where two or more applications filed by the same applicant contain conflicting claims, elimination of such claims from all but one application may be required in the absence of good and sufficient reason for their retention during pendency in more than one application.

The only **requirement** that Rule 78 (b) authorizes is the elimination of conflicting claims from all but one co-pending applications.

In the instant Final Office Action, Examiner has not required the elimination of all conflicting claims from all but one application, but instead has required Applicants to: 1) file terminal disclaimers in each of the related 328 applications; 2) provide an affidavit; or 3) resolve all conflicts between claims in the related 328 applications. None of the options in the requirement is authorized by Rule 78 (b), and therefore Applicants respectfully submit that such a requirement is improper.

With respect to the PTO's authority to act within Rule 78 (b) regarding the rejection of conflicting claims, MPEP § 822.01 states that:

Under 37 CFR § 1.78 (b), the practice relative to overlapping claims in applications co-pending before the examiner..., is as follows: Where claims in one application are unpatentable over claims of another application of the same inventive entity because they recite the same invention, *a complete examination should be made of the claims of each application and all appropriate rejections should be entered in each application, including rejections based upon prior art. The claims of each application may also be rejected on the grounds of provisional double patenting on the claims of the other application* whether or not any claims avoid the prior art. Where appropriate, the same prior art may be relied upon in each of the applications. MPEP 822.01 (6th Ed., Rev. 3, 1997), (*emphasis added*).



In light of the requirement of the Final Office Action, MPEP § 822.01 and 37 CFR § 1.78 (b) are not applicable since there has not been any rejection with regard to the elimination of conflicting claims from all but one co-pending application.

**4. The Assertion That Failure to Comply with the Requirement Will Result in Abandonment of Applicants' Application is Improper**

Applicants' prospective failure to comply with the above requirements cannot properly result in abandonment of the present application. Applicants respectfully submit that abandonment of an application can properly occur only:

- (1) for failure to respond within a provided time period (under Rule 135);
- (2) as an express abandonment (under Rule 138); or
- (3) the result of failing to timely pay the issue fee (under Rule 316).

There is no provision in the rules permitting abandonment for failure to comply with any of the presented requirements. To impose an improper requirement upon Applicants and then hold the application is to be abandoned for failure to comply with the improper requirement violates the rules of practice before the USPTO.

Furthermore, Examiner is in effect attempting to create a substantive rule which is above and beyond the rulemaking authority of the USPTO, and therefore is invalid.

In the *Application of Mott*, 539 F.2d 1291, 190 USPQ 536 (CCPA 1976), the applicant had conflicting claims in multiple applications. The CCPA held that action by the Examiner which would result in automatic abandonment of the application was legally untenable. *Id.* at 1296, 190 USPQ at 541. In the present application, Examiner has asserted that there are conflicting claims in multiple applications, and that non-compliance of the Final Office Action's requirement will result in an automatic abandonment. Therefore, under *Mott's* analysis, the Final Office Action's result of abandonment of Applicants' application is legally untenable.

**5. Response to Apparent Conflict of Claims**

Applicants submit that the presentation of the Final Office Action Appendix fails to demonstrate any conflicts between claims of the present application and claims of the co-pending applications. Rather, the Final Office Action Appendix compares representative claims of *other* applications in attempt to establish that “conflicting claims exist between the 328 related co-pending applications.” Absent any evidence of conflicting claims between the Applicants’ present application and any other of Applicants’ co-pending applications, any requirement imposed upon Applicants to resolve such alleged conflicts is improper.

**6. Request for Withdrawal of Requirement**

Therefore, Applicants respectfully request that Examiner reconsider and withdraw the requirement that Applicants: (1) file terminal disclaimers in each of the related 328 applications terminally disclaiming each of the other 327 applications; (2) provide an affidavit attesting to the fact that all claims in the 328 applications have been reviewed by applicant and that no conflicting claims exist between the applications; or (3) resolve all conflicts between claims in the above identified 328 applications by identifying how all the claims in the instant application are distinct and separate inventions from all the claims in the above identified 328 applications, which upon failing to do so will abandon the application.

**7. Filing of Supplemental Oath**

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Applicants will file a supplemental oath under 37 C.F.R. § 1.67 for each application when Examiner identifies allowable subject matter. Applicants respectfully propose that the filing of individual supplemental oaths attesting to the absence of claim conflicts between previously patented claims and subsequently allowed claims is a more reasonable method of ensuring the patentable distinctness of subsequently allowed claims.

Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.105, § 1.106 & § 1.78 (b), Examiner has the duty to make every applicable rejection, including double patenting rejection. Failure to make every proper rejection denies Applicants all rights and benefits related thereto, e.g., Applicants' right to appeal, etc. Once obviousness-type double patenting analysis has been applied and conflicting claims have been determined to exist, only a *provisional* obviousness-type double patenting rejection is possible until claims from one application are allowed.

**D. Information Disclosure Statement**

The Applicants appreciate the Examiner's review of the Information Disclosure Statements filed 12-11-95, 12-22-95, 2-6-96, 4-17-96 and 4-7-97 and have addressed those specific concerns raised in paragraph 6 of the Final Office Action. It is the Applicants' understanding that the Examiner raised the following 5 issues:

- (1) the reasons for such a large number of references cited,
- (2) foreign language references cited without a statement of relevance or translation have not been considered,
- (3) the relevancy of numerous references listed in the Information Disclosure Statements are subsequent to the Applicants' latest effective filing date of 9/11/87,
- (4) citation of references apparently unrelated to the subject matter of the claimed invention, and
- (5) citation of database search results listed in foreign languages where no copy was provided.

**1. Reason for Citation of Large Number of References**

The reason that the Applicants submitted such a large number of references in the Information Disclosure Statements was that a large portion of the information cited by the Applicants was brought to the Applicants' attention in the discovery processes in a previous litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia (*Personalized Mass Media Corp. v. The Weather Channel, Inc.* Docket No. 2:95 cv 242) and an investigation by the International Trade Commission (*In the Matter of Certain Digital Satellite System (DSS) Receivers And Components Thereof*, No. 337 TA 392, which was direct to U.S. Pat. No. 5,335,277) regarding claims in the Applicants' related issued patents. The documents listed in the Information Disclosure Statement were cited during the previous litigation/investigative proceedings by the alleged infringers in the aforementioned proceedings as being relevant and material to patentability of the claims in the related patents. The Applicants submitted those materials in the Information Disclosure Statement to the PTO at the earliest possible time in order to file them in compliance with the 3 month requirement stated in the certification used to submit the Information Disclosure Statement before the Final Office Action was issued as is necessary under 37 CFR § 1.97 (c) (1). In such haste, entries were inadvertently submitted which do not appear on their face to be material to the patentability of the present application. Applicants have corrected this error with the submission of the corrected Information Disclosure Statement as shown in Appendix B. However, it is the Applicants' understanding that not all references cited must be material to patentability in order for such references to be considered. In § 609 of the MPEP, it states,

"[t]hese individuals also may want the Office to consider information for a variety of reasons: e.g., without first determining whether the information meets any particular standard of materiality, or because another patent office considered the information to be relevant in a counterpart or related patent application filed in another country, or to make sure that the examiner has an opportunity to consider the same information that was considered by the individuals that were substantially involved in the preparation or prosecution of a patent application."

Applicants' position is that information that was considered material in previous litigation would fall into the 'variety of reasons' category as stated above. Applicants intention was not to confuse or make difficult the examination process for the Examiner, but was instead to be forthright and open in disclosing all information deemed to be relevant to the application in issue by third parties.

## **2. Citations of Foreign Language References**

Applicants have re-examined the foreign references listed in all of the Information Disclosure Statements and have either eliminated such references from the list, included translations herewith or provided statements as to the relevancy of such references (APPENDIX A). The inclusion of translations with this response is in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (f) which states in part, "[I]f a bona fide attempt is made to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 1.98, but part of the required content is inadvertently omitted, additional time may be given to enable full compliance." The omission of any translations and/or relevancy statements for foreign references were inadvertent and unintentional and are herein submitted in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (f).

## **3. References in the Information Disclosure Statements Subsequent to Applicants' Latest Effective Filing Date of 9/11/87**

Examiner stated "[n]umerous references listed in the IDS are subsequent to the applicant's latest effective filing date of 9/11/87, therefore, the relevancy of those references is unclear." Upon further examination, the Applicants have eliminated those patents and publications after the effective filing date for the present application. It is the Applicants' understanding that the effective filing date for the present application is 9/11/87.

## **4. Citation of Unrelated References**

Applicants appreciate the Examiner pointing out such references that were listed yet on their face appear to be unrelated to the subject matter of the present application. In response to such information, the Applicants have reviewed the cited references and removed any such references which appear to be unrelated on their face to the claimed subject matter such as the patent for a beehive, the patent for a chemical compound and numerous computer printout search results.

**5. Citation of Database Search Results**

Database search results listed in foreign languages where no copy was provided have been eliminated from the substitute Information Disclosure Statement included with this office action.

The Applicants offer the corrected Information Disclosure Statement (APPENDIX B) as a substitute to the previously filed Information Disclosure Statement filed 4/7/97. No new entries have been entered, only citations which have, upon further examination, been determined not to be relevant to the claimed subject matter have been eliminated, typographical errors have been corrected, dates inserted where possible and the list shortened as a result. It is the Applicants' intention that such corrected Information Disclosure Statement will help clarify any issues previously raised by the Examiner and aid in the prosecution of the present patent application.

**E. Response to Final Office Action dated 2/04/98**

**1. Applicants note the Examiner's comments in paragraph 2 of the Final Office Action**

Applicants note with appreciation the Examiner's comments in paragraph 2 and contend that the Amendment and Response of July 3, 1997 was concise and responsive to the previous Office Action. Because the response appears to have created some concern on the part of the Examiner, Applicants will take care to heed the Examiner's recommendations in order to advance the prosecution of the present application in the most expedient manner possible.

**2. Withdrawal of previous rejection**

Applicants note with appreciation the withdrawal of the rejection of the claims in the instant application under double patenting based on the broad analysis of *In re Schneller* as set forth in the previous Office Action.

**3. Applicants request withdrawal of the Claim  
Objections**

Regarding paragraph 7, Applicants note the objection to Claim 10 because of the noted informality. Applicants believe that Claim 10, as amended herein above, meets the Examiner's requirements with regard to the noted objection.

Regarding paragraph 8, Applicants note with appreciation the Examiner's comments. However, the Applicants assert that it is not only possible, but necessary that in order for a message to be received, it must at some point be assembled. The receiver is capable of assembling a portion of the message as well as receiving a portion of the message as suggested. Applicants assert that no new matter has been added.

**F. Response to Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112**

**1. Specification Support of Claim 10**

Paragraph 9 of the Final Office Action rejects Claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventors, at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. The Final Office Action specified part of the language of Claim 10 as not being supported by the specification as originally filed. Applicants respectfully assert that Claim 10, as presently amended herein, renders this rejection moot.

The Final Office Action seems to assert that there are multiple alternatives in the Claim as drafted. However, Claim 10, as amended, provides for storing one of a datum and code and that *said stored one of said code and said datum* is then selected and similarly *said stored one of said selected code and said datum* is communicated. The six permutations set forth in paragraph 9 of the Final Office Action are therefore not positively recited in Claim 10 as suggested.

## **2. Indefiniteness of Claims 10-12**

Paragraph 10 of the Final Office Action rejects Claims 10 -12 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as his invention. Applicants contend that Claims 10-12, as amended in this response (see Summary of Amendments above), are sufficient to overcome the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.

## **3. Conclusion**

Applicants respectfully submit that amended claims 10-12 of the subject application particularly point out and claim the subject matter sufficiently for one of ordinary skill in the art to comprehend the bounds of the claimed invention. The test for definiteness of a claim is whether one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the patent claim when read in light of the specification, and if the claims so read reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention, no more is required. *Credle v. Bond*, 25 F.3d 1556, 30 USPQ2d 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The legal standard for definiteness is whether a claim reasonably apprises those of skill in the art of its scope. *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Applicants have amended Claims 10-12 to enhance clarity and respectfully submit that all pending claims are fully enabled by the specification and distinctly indicate the metes and bounds of the claimed subject matter.

Applicants believe that the above recited changes are sufficient to overcome the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112, first and second paragraph, and respectfully request withdrawal of these rejections. Applicants provide these specific embodiments in support of the pending claims by way of example only. The claims must be read as broadly as is reasonable in light of the specification, and Applicants in no way intend that their submission of excerpts/examples be construed to unnecessarily restrict the scope of the claimed subject matter.



**G. Response to Rejection of Claims for Absence of Novelty**

**1. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a, b, and e) Rejection over Saeki et al.**

Claims 10-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a, b, and e) as being anticipated by Saeki et al. (U.S. Patent No. 4,455,570). The Applicants note the effort the Examiner put forth in attempting to define the presently claimed invention in terms of the language, express and implied, in Saeki et al. However, Applicants note that the reference fails to teach all of the limitations of the presently claimed invention. Additionally, on several occasions the Final Office Action makes reference to Saeki et al. Column 3, line 9 which states in its entirety, "frequency, so that the requested data is reproduced on". This reference, although part of a much larger disclosure, is neither explanatory nor supportive of many of the rejections set forth in the Final Office Action. However, in order to advance the prosecution of the present application, Applicants will assume the Final Office Action is making reference to the majority of the disclosure of Saeki et al. which surrounds the specific citations.

**a. Independent Claims 10 & 11**

With respect to Applicants' Claims 10 and 11, Saeki et al. fails to teach, *inter alia*, the Applicants' claim limitation of an interactive mass medium program output apparatus having an input device to receive input from a subscriber as the Final Office Action suggests. The Final Office Action states that the signal generator 41-3 is a memory device. Applicants are unable to find sufficient disclosure in Saeki et al. to reach this conclusion. There is no teaching in Saeki et al. that would lead one to believe that the depression of the buttons 50 on the keyboard 44 constitute storage in memory for later retrieval. Saeki et al. does not meet the "broad but reasonable" definition of what the Applicants define as memory in the mass medium program output apparatus.

Additionally, Saeki et al. fails to teach the Applicants' claim limitation of the mass medium program output apparatus having a processor for processing the

subscriber reply. The Final Office Action suggests that "Saeki et al. suggest the circuitry structure of items 44 and 41 be used to perform actions toward the result of the subscriber getting the data requested - col. 3, line 9." The Final Office Action seems to be saying that the input device 44 is part of the processor. This being the case, the reference is distinct from the presently claimed invention.

Further, the Final Office Action equates the central facility 1 with the remote site. Therefore, all of the processing actually takes place at the remote site and is transmitted to the subscriber's television instead of occurring at the mass medium output apparatus as taught in the present invention. Additionally, there is no mention in Saeki et al. of a message being assembled, as stated in the Final Office Action, and therefore, the designated specific combined medium programming cannot be delivered on the basis of a message that does not exist.

**b. Independent Claim 12**

With respect to Applicants' Claim 12, Saeki et al. fails to teach the Applicants' claim limitation of an instruct signal which is effective to either effect a transmission station or a receiver station to generate a specific combined medium program. The Final Office Action states, and the Applicants respectfully disagree, that there is an inherent instruct signal which is effective at a receiver station. Assuming, *arguendo*, that there is an instruct signal taught in Saeki et al., it would only act at a receiver station as the Final Office Action states. However, the Final Office Action provides no supportive basis, other than a mere conclusory remark, for the assertion that the instruct signal is, in fact, inherent in Saeki et al. ....

Furthermore, Saeki et al. fail to teach the Applicants' Claim limitation of a separate receiver station and transmission station. The Final Office Action asserts that the reference *suggests* a transmission station within the central station 1. There are not two separate stations that perform all of the system's functions as in the present application. It is not inherent that an instruct signal is received in the Saeki et al. system

as stated in the presently claimed invention. Due to the failure of the reference to teach or describe the Applicants' instruct signal, it can be readily concluded that the nonexistent signal cannot be transmitted along with the specific combined medium programming transmission and the transmitter control signal as presently claimed, thus failing to disclose the necessary steps to be anticipatory of the presently claimed invention.


Applicants respectfully submit that Saeki et al. does not anticipate Claims 10-12 as amended since the reference fails to disclose , teach, suggest, or imply every element of the claimed invention, and Applicants respectfully request that the 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a, b, and e) rejection of Claims 10-12 be withdrawn. For a prior art reference to anticipate in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102, every element of the claimed invention must be identically shown in a single reference. *In re Bond*, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990). There must be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention. *Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genetech, Inc.*, 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2d 1001, 18 USPQ2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Absence from a cited reference of any element of a claim negates anticipation of that claim by the reference. *Kloster Speedsteel AB v Crucible, Inc.*, 230 USPQ 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986), *on rehearing*, 231 USPQ 160 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

### III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that all outstanding objections and rejections have been overcome and/or rendered moot. Further, all pending claims are patentably distinguishable over the prior art, taken in any proper combination. Thus, there being no further outstanding objections or rejections, the application is submitted as being in a condition for allowance, which action is earnestly solicited.

If the Examiner has any remaining informalities to be addressed, it is believed that prosecution can be expedited by the Examiner contacting the undersigned attorney for a telephone interview to discuss resolution of such informalities.

Respectfully submitted,



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